India's Defence Strategy Shifts: Private Sector to Build Astra Mk-2 Missile

New Delhi, India Jul 15, 2026 ALN: TECHNOLOGY & NATIONAL SECURITY

Sometime in the coming weeks, India's Ministry of Defence is expected to issue a Request for Proposal inviting private companies to build the Astra Mk-2, a beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile with a reach of 180 to 200 kilometres. This development marks a significant shift in India's defense strategy, as it opens the door for private sector involvement in missile production. Major players such as Adani Defence, Bharat Forge, the Tata Group, Mahindra, and ICOMM are reported to be in contention for this pivotal project. This initiative represents the first instance of a frontline Indian missile being produced on a private assembly line, signaling a new era in India's defense manufacturing landscape.

The rationale behind this strategic shift is grounded in the pressing need for increased missile production capacity. Bharat Dynamics Limited (BDL), the state-owned firm that has long maintained a near-monopoly on tactical missile production, is struggling to meet the growing demand from both the armed forces and international export clients. Notably, defense exports reached a record Rs 38,424 crore in the fiscal year ending March 2026, with countries like Indonesia expressing interest in acquiring the Astra missile. This burgeoning order book has outstripped BDL's production capabilities, necessitating a broader involvement of private firms in missile manufacturing.

However, the timing of this strategic pivot raises concerns that have not been fully addressed in the announcement cycle. As India disperses missile production across the corporate sector, it does so at a moment when global conflicts have demonstrated that missile factories are prime targets in warfare. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine, for example, has seen Ukrainian forces strike at least six Russian missile production facilities since March, part of a larger trend of attacks on defense-industrial infrastructure. This context amplifies the risks associated with shifting missile production to private entities, which may not have the same level of security as state-owned facilities.

What actually changed

Under the incoming Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP) 2026, the Indian Ministry of Defence has ended BDL's exclusive hold on tactical missile production. The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has initiated a more collaborative approach by distributing ten to twelve missile development programs across both public and private firms. Notable private companies, including Adani Defence and Aerospace, Bharat Forge, ICOMM, and Solar Defence and Aerospace, have been designated as Development-cum-Production Partners. These projects encompass a diverse array of missile systems, including an indigenous anti-ship missile, the Rudram series of anti-radiation missiles, a man-portable air defense system, a 1,000 kg glide bomb, and a drone-launched precision munition.

This strategic shift is indicative of a broader trend toward involving private industry in critical defense sectors, including ballistic missile production. Defence Secretary Rajesh Kumar Singh articulated this vision at the CII Annual Business Summit in May, emphasizing the need to engage private firms in the production of strategic missile systems. The tactical ballistic missile Pralay, which boasts a range of 500 kilometers, is widely anticipated to be the next program opened up for private sector involvement. This progression follows the earlier decision to end Hindustan Aeronautics Limited's monopoly in aerospace manufacturing, illustrating a deliberate and systematic approach to reforming India's defense procurement landscape.

The factory is now the target

The evolving nature of modern warfare has underscored the vulnerability of missile production facilities. The year 2026 has witnessed a concerted effort by Ukraine to target Russian missile factories, with at least 48 recorded attacks on Russian defense-industrial facilities occurring between January and June. Notably, thirteen of these attacks took place in June alone. In response, Russia has retaliated by striking facilities associated with Ukrainian drone production, causing significant damage and disruption. Similarly, the US-Israeli campaign against Iran has targeted and severely damaged ballistic missile production facilities, demonstrating a clear pattern: production capabilities have become the focal point of military strategy.

The implications of this shift are profound. While air defense systems can intercept missiles in flight, there is no defense against the loss of the production lines that create them. Consequently, military planners worldwide have recalibrated their target lists to prioritize production facilities. The factory has supplanted the launcher as the central element in modern military strategy, and the consequences of this shift are likely to reverberate through future conflicts.

The exposure gap

One of the critical concerns surrounding the shift to private missile production is the security of these facilities. A BDL plant operates within the confines of defense land, benefiting from robust security measures and a vetted workforce attuned to classified operations. In contrast, a private missile production line will likely be situated in commercial industrial parks, subject to the vulnerabilities inherent in corporate IT environments. This transition raises questions about the security protocols that will be implemented to safeguard sensitive production processes.

The implications of transparency in private companies cannot be overstated. Listed companies are bound by disclosure obligations, meaning that information about capacity expansions and large defense contracts will be publicly accessible. This transparency effectively lowers the barrier for adversaries seeking to compile target lists, as they can glean critical information from investor presentations and quarterly filings without the need for covert intelligence operations.

India's strategy of dispersing its missile arsenal across private entities does not necessarily translate to a corresponding enhancement of security measures. The cyber exposure associated with private production facilities also raises alarms. Recent reports surrounding India's new space cybersecurity guidelines indicate that cyberattack attempts surged to over 1.5 million during Operation Sindoor, with attacks on government networks increasing nearly sevenfold. Whereas these attacks were directed at a singular hardened government perimeter, missile production will now be distributed across multiple corporate networks, each with its own vulnerabilities and potential points of failure.

The case for dispersal, taken seriously

Despite the challenges posed by this strategic shift, there are compelling arguments in favor of dispersing missile production across multiple private firms. The most significant advantage is the mitigation of risk associated with a single point of failure. A single BDL facility represents a vulnerability; a successful strike on that campus could halt national missile production. Conversely, ten production sites spread across ten different firms are inherently more resilient and harder to incapacitate. The experience of Ukraine's drone industry serves as a case study, as it has managed to endure years of targeted attacks by dispersing its operations across small workshops.

However, it is essential to recognize that Ukraine's dispersal was a necessity borne out of conflict, with relocation and secrecy enforced by survival instincts. In contrast, India's dispersal is a procurement reform aimed at enhancing production capabilities. The forthcoming Request for Proposal will evaluate the production capacity of private firms, but there is currently no public documentation outlining the necessary physical hardening standards, air defense cover, or mandatory cybersecurity requirements for private missile production lines. This lack of clarity presents a critical gap in India's defense strategy, one that must be addressed to ensure the security and resilience of its missile production capabilities.

Bottom Line

The Astra Mk-2 missile program is designed to counter the Chinese PL-15E missiles supplied to Pakistan, particularly in the context of heightened regional tensions. As India seeks to scale up its production capabilities, private industry represents the most expedient route to achieving this goal. The DAP 2026 has clarified who will build the missile, but it leaves unresolved the critical question of who will protect the factories responsible for manufacturing these vital defense assets. As India embarks on this new chapter in its defense strategy, it must carefully consider the security implications of involving the private sector in missile production to safeguard its national interests in an increasingly complex geopolitical landscape.